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On 29 January 2021, the Portuguese Parliament approved the decriminalization
of active euthanasia and assisted suicide for adults in a situation of intolerable
suffering, with a definitive injury of extreme gravity according to scientific consensus,
or incurable and fatal disease. A ruling delivered on 15 March by the Constitutional
Court halted this legal innovation and cut short on introducing the right to a self-
determined death in the Portuguese legal order (press release here). The Court
distanced itself from the standards developed by European sister courts to uphold
an objective dimension of the right to life, which entails a strong duty of protecting
life and its quality until the very end. Yet, it has kept the door open to an amendment
to the bill that can render it constitutionally valid. The ball is rolling. It is now up to
the parliament to follow the detailed guidelines provided by the ruling and devise an
alternative formulation that avoids legal indeterminability and can find shelter in the
judges’ narrow lines.
Medically assisted death in Portugal
On 15 March, the Portuguese Constitutional Court halted a significant parliamentary
bill aimed at legalizing medically assisted death in Portugal. It would render
acceptable active euthanasia and assisted suicide for adults in a situation of
intolerable suffering, with a definitive injury of extreme gravity according to scientific
consensus, or incurable and fatal disease. This bill results from a legislative process
whose roots go back to a civic movement for the right to die with dignity launched
in November 2015. After a first unsuccessful legislative initiative in 2018, the new
parliamentary majority elected in October 2019 passed the bill that would give
Portugal a pioneering role in regulating the right to a dignified death.
 Following an a priori review triggered by the President of the Republic, the
Constitutional Court found that the concept “definitive injury of extreme gravity
according to scientific consensus” lacks normative density and is therefore in breach
of the principle of determinability of the laws as a corollary of the rule of law and the
requirement for a parliamentary law. This conclusion prompted a presidential veto
of the legislative act, which has now returned to parliament. A two-thirds majority
could still confirm the act. However, parliamentarians have already announced that a
new draft will be developed to address the Constitutional Court’s concerns and thus
expunge the unconstitutional aspects of the bill.
Medically assisted death is not in breach of the right
to life
The President’s request for prior review by the Constitutional Court raised
controversy because it refrained from questioning the compatibility of euthanasia
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with the Constitution, recognizing that “it is up to the legislature to allow or forbid
euthanasia in each particular moment, following the social consensus.” The fact that
the President decided to draft the review request in such narrow terms and implicitly
recognize the legislature’s legitimacy to regulate euthanasia and medically assisted
death was surprising.
According to Art. 2(1) of the bill, the anticipation of medically assisted death is
considered not punishable when it occurs by the decision of a person, of legal age,
whose will is current and reiterated, serious, free, and informed, in a situation of
intolerable suffering, with a definitive injury of extreme gravity according to scientific
consensus or an incurable and fatal disease, when practiced or assisted by health
professionals. The President challenged two conditions of the procedure – the
concepts of “intolerable suffering” and “definitive injury of extreme gravity according
to scientific consensus” for breach of the principle of determinability of the laws as a
corollary of the rule of law and the requirement for a parliamentary law.
Movements that oppose euthanasia and medically assisted death expressed
disappointment with the review request’s modesty as they feared the Court would
refrain from measuring medically assisted death against the right to life. However,
the Court decided that it should first address the constitutionality of medically
assisted death in light of the right to life per se before analyzing the concrete
conditions challenged by the President. According to the judges, it was an inevitable
and preliminary question to the President’s interrogations.
The judges found that the right to life, which is formulated in extensive terms in
the Constitution (“human life is inviolable”), includes an objective dimension that
consecrates the state’s duty to protect life, including those who want to die. The right
to life entails an objective dimension comprising a duty to protect and promote life
and its quality. In discharging this duty of protection, the legislature must adopt “a
life-oriented legal protection system.”
In the face of the inherent tension between the duty to protect life and the respect for
private autonomy, the Court added that in a democratic, secular, and plural society,
“the right to live cannot become a duty to live under any circumstances.” A duty to
live in situations of suffering would be incompatible with the self-determination of
those in pain and breach of their human dignity. Therefore, this condition of human
vulnerability can create tension with an unconditional protection of human life by
sacrificing the individual autonomy of people who experience suffering by converting
their right to live into a duty of painful fulfillment.
Remarkably, however, the Court did not articulate this reasoning in light of a right
to a self-determined death nor of the fundamental right to the free development
of personality. It instead limited its reasoning to recognizing that under these
limited circumstances, the democratic legislature is not prevented from regulating
medically assisted death, subject to the adoption of safeguards to ensure freedom,
responsibility, and the protection of the most vulnerable.
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There is no fundamental right to a self-determined
death
By framing medically assisted death in light of an objective dimension of the
right to life and rejecting an autonomous normative relevance to individual
self-determination, the Portuguese Court decisively moves away from recent
comparative examples. Despite being traditionally open towards comparative
and international law, the Constitutional Court did not draw inspiration from
the European Court of Human Rights doctrine or the German and Austrian
Constitutional Courts to recognize the existence of a fundamental right to a self-
determined death. Although it acknowledged said acquis and extensively cited the
relevant case law (Bundesverfassungsgericht’s decision of 26 February 2020 and
Verfassungsgerichtshof’s decision of 11 December 2020), it refused to join the
consensus reached by those courts on recognizing a fundamental right to a self-
determined death, based on the right to life or the individual autonomy and free will
of the individual. The relevance attributed to personal autonomy is thus not carried to
its further consequences by the Court.
Nevertheless, it still ascribed constitutional relevance to situations where the duty
to protect life yields to private autonomy in concrete (and extreme) circumstances.
Although this is formulated in somewhat opaque terms, it seems that the Court may
be willing to accept a right to a self-determined death if it is drawn narrowly. These
would be cases concerning a choice between a slow, painful, and agonizing death
and a calm and quick death. In the Court’s words, these cases concern a choice
between different dying ways and not a choice between life and death.
In this sense, as the Court finds that medically assisted death is not per se in breach
of the right to life, it draws heavily on the criteria developed by the Italian Corte
costituzionale in the Capatto case. This case, however, concerned a situation where
the Corte was confronted with the blanket criminalization of assisted suicide and
decided, at first , to call on parliament to pass legislation legalizing assistance to
suicide in extreme and dramatic cases and, secondly , in the face of the legislature’s
inaction, to enact the regulation covering those very same situations. In the
Portuguese case, by contrast, the Court is confronted with the opposite scenario
where the legislature has materialized its democratic decision to exempt from
punishment situations of euthanasia and assistance to suicide.
As the Court draws these narrow lines while it assesses medically assisted death’s
compatibility with the Constitution, it was not asked to review but found preliminary to
the conditions effectively challenged by the President – the judges grant clearance,
albeit restrictedly, to the procedure. Suppose euthanasia and assistance to suicide
have indeed been measured against the right to life in their full extent. In that case,
their constitutional admissibility is limited to circumstances where, as the ruling
mentions, the individual finds herself “at a time near the end”. This restriction would
then have the effect of actively reducing the legislative act’s scope to those extreme
situations where people were facing imminent death situations.
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Dialogical concerns
The Court found that the concept “definitive injury of extreme gravity according
to scientific consensus” lacks normative density and is therefore in breach of
the principle of determinability of the laws as a corollary of the rule of law and
the requirement for a parliamentary law. The Court puts forward alternative
formulations signaling different options that the legislature can follow to render future
amendments constitutionally valid. One such alternative includes a reference to
the Spanish proposal of Ley orgánica de regulación de la eutanásia, which was
approved in parliament only a few days after the ruling was delivered.
This assistance by the Court to the legislature must be welcomed with caution.
Indeed, it is in line with previous case law where the judges expressed similar
concerns to engage with the legislature in providing guidance and clarifications.
However, a unified reading of the ruling shows that the majority of the judges
are reluctant to accept medically assisted death in situations that fall outside the
dramatic cases where only a choice between a long and agonizing death and a quick
and peaceful death is at stake. But if that is the case, then the concept of “definitive
injury of extreme gravity according to scientific consensus” would suffer from other
constitutional liabilities, namely that it is not necessarily related to a fatal condition.
Eloquently, one of the dissenting opinions claims that the legislature will now face a
challenge of comparable difficulty to putting a camel through the eye of a needle.
Since there is no doctrine of stare decisis and a significant change in the Court’s
composition will take place in the following months (five of its thirteen judges will be
replaced), the main consequence of this ruling is that it kept the dialogue with the
legislature open for the future introduction of medically assisted death in Portugal.
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